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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
place stricter requirements on entries by officers than the bare mini-
mum imposed by the constitutional limitations of the fourth amend-
ment, and that they will require a strong showing of exceptional circum-
stances before upholding a search which does not strictly comply with
the provisions of the statute.
Mandy Welch
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SECTIONS 9-503 AND 9-504 DE-
CLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS.
Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974).
Constitutionality attacks have been numerous on sections 9-503
and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Those sections permit
self-help repossession of automobiles without judicial supervision. In
Watson v. Branch County Bank,' one of the more recent attacks, the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Michigan held sections
9-503 and 9-504 to be unconstitutional. Three plaintiffs brought the
class action suit to enjoin the secured creditor defendants from repos-
sessing automobiles without judicial authority or process. The plain-
tiffs alleged that self-help repossession of automobiles subject to secur-
ity agreements by the named defendants as authorized by sections 9-
503 and 9-5042 deprived them of their property without due process
of law contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and the implementing civil rights statute.3 In each of the pres-
ent three instances the repossession of the plaintiff's automobile by the
creditor defendant was peaceful and had been provided for in the se-
curity agreement.
The plaintiffs' claim in Watson was that sections 9-5034 and 9-
1. 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
2. Enacted in Michigan as MIcH. Com7. LAws ANN. §§ 440.9503, 440.9504
(1967).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 reads as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available" to the se-
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5045 of the Uniform Commercial Code together with state laws and
regulations concerning motor vehicle financing and the licensing of re-
possessors caused the private actions to be under color of state action
and that such actions were in violation of plaintiffs' guarantee of due
process.6 The district court agreed and devoted the majority of the
opinion to the due process question. After deciding that repossession
was violative of due process, the court found that the repossession ac-
tion was under color of state law:
In legalizing such self-help repossession contracts, the state,
through its legislature, has engaged in active and effective
state action by delegating both power and process to the
creditors. The creditor has the substantive power to declare
and adjudge that the debtor has defaulted on his contract.
The creditor levies on his own judgment when he repossesses
the automobile, and then he conducts his own foreclosure
sale, the results of which are routinely validated by the Secre-
tary of State. Because of the economics of legal action and
automobile financing, debtors as a practical matter have no
legal remedy for abuses.7
cured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reason-
ably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render
equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises un-
der section 9-504.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 reads in pertinent part:(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency.
(3)" Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings
and may be by way of one or more contracts. . . . Unless collateral is perish-
able or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold
on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor. ...
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein,
discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest
or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights andinterests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements
of this part or of any judicial proceedings(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of
any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured
party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
6. 380 F. Supp. at 950.
7. Id. at 968.
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By making UCC 9-503 and 9-504 applicable in the context
of comprehensive regulations of automobile purchase financ-
ing where corporate creditors have overwhelming power, the
state has deliberately denied the plaintiffs their constitutional
due.
In declaring a default and executing the judgment, the
corporate creditors who utilize UCC 9-503 are clearly per-
forming traditional state functions.8
The Watson decision is contrary to the majority of opinions. The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, 9 Third, 10 Fifth,"
Eighth,' -2 and Ninth 3 Circuits have sustained the constitutionality of the
sections as well as other specific state statutes related thereto.' 4 To
date the Tenth Circuit has not decided the precise issue of the consti-
tutionality of the sections. Oklahoma upheld the right of self-help in
the 1967 case of Kroger v. Ogden.'5 This right of self-help still exists
in Oklahoma, restricted only by the requirement that the repossession
be peacefully accomplished.
Constitutional attacks on sections 9-503 and 9-504 will continue
until the United States Supreme Court resolves the issue. An oppor-
tunity for such a resolution recently faded with the Court's denial of
certiorari to Adams v. Southern California First National Bank. 6
Adams represented an opportunity for the court to define the scope
and thrust of the "state action" doctrine because in that case all of the
basic arguments of unconstitutionality were advanced and resolved in
favor of the creditor." The issue will frequently arise until the Court
clarifies the scope and thrust of the "state action" doctrine on a record
adequate enough for the lower courts to handle the variety of factual
situations urged by debtors to establish the presence of "state aotion".' 8
8. Id. at 972.
9. Shirley v. State National Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1974).
10. Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir. 1974).
11. James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. June 19, 1974) (No. 73-1897). Nichols v.
Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974).
13. Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973); cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3277 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (No. 73-1842).
14. Norris, Supreme Court Urged to Resolve Constitutionality of Sell-Help Repos-
session, 28 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 119 (1974).
15. 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967). Prior to the U.C.C. Oklahoma had allowed the
secured party to take possession without judicial process so long as it was done without
breach of the peace. See Firebough v. Gunther, 106 Okl. 131, 233 P. 460 (1925).
16. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3277 (U.S. Nov. 12,
1974) (No. 73-1842).
17. Norris, supra note 14, at 121.
18. Id. at 119.
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The Court, however, is not likely to grant certiorari until one or more
of the remaining circuit courts that have not passed on the issue decide
contrary to those that have held the sections constitutional.
Repossession under sections 9-503 and 9-504 is not the only rem-
edy available to secured creditors. The creditor can use the state's pre-
judgment replevin provisions. Prejudgment replevin provisions, in
general, were passed upon by the United States Supreme Court in
Fuentes v. Shevin.19 In Fuentes the Court held Florida and Pennsyl-
vania replevin statutes invalid under the fourteenth amendment saying
they worked a deprivation of property without due process of law by
denying prior opportunity to be heard before the chattels were taken
from the possessor. Procedural due process requires an opportunity
for a hearing before the state authorizes its agents to seize property
in the possession of a person upon the application of another.20  The
Court's decision in Fuentes prompted nationwide revision of prejudg-
ment replevin statutes. Oklahoma revised sections 1571 and 1580,
and added section 1571.1 to -title 12 in reaction to Fuentes.21 The sub-
stance of the revision was to provide two methods whereby the plaintiff
could claini immediate delivery of the chattel. One method provides
for notice to the debtor and a judicial hearing prior to the issuance of
the order of delivery by the court. The alternate method gives the
debtor five days to contest the repossession and if he fails to request
a hearing the court clerk will issue the order of delivery. A prompt
hearing will be set if the debtor responds to the notice and either party
requests a hearing. The revision also includes penalties on the debtor
if he uses the notification to dispose of or otherwise render the property
unavailable to the plaintiff.22 Recently the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of similar procedures in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co.2 3 The importance of Mitchell is that the Court held
that provisions for immediate delivery to the plaintiff do not need to
include notice to the debtor so long as the order of delivery has been
issued upon a verified affidavit and upon a judge's authority. The deb-
tor must also be allowed to immediately seek dissolution of the order,
which must be granted unless the creditor proves the grounds for is-
19. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
20. Id.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1571, 1571.1, 1580 (Supp. 1974).
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1571.1 (Supp. 1974).
23. 94 S.Ct. 1895 (1974).
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suance (existence of debt, lien, and delinquency).2 4  The Oklahoma
statute appears adequate and would even seem to be over-protective
of the debtor. To date no cases have been passed upon by the Okla-
homa appellate courts.
In Watson the creditors did not repossess under the existing Mich-
igan prejudgment replevin provision (which had already been revised
to comport with the requirements of Fuentes), but rather repossessed
using only the language of sections 9-503 and 9-504.25 The deficien-
cies of due process asserted in Watson are adequately provided for in
the revised Oklahoma statute. Although Watson may be overruled on
appeal, creditors who repossess using only sections 9-503 and 9-504
(and related state statutes adopting the sections) will always invite liti-
gation, especially in those circuits that have not yet passed on the con-
stitutionality of the UCC sections. The Tenth Circuit is one of those
circuits. Creditors using prejudgment replevin provisions such as Ok-
lahoma's are virtually assured of avoiding costly litigation since those
statutes substantially accord with the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Fuentes.
Charles 0. Hanson
24. 94 S.Ct. at 1897.
25. 380 F. Supp. at 975.
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